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The Convention on the Future of Europe:
Transatlantic Perspectives
IN JUNE 2003, THE CONVENTION on the Future of Europe delivered
its project for a draft Constitution to the European Council as a
basis for negotiations during the 2003-2004 Intergovernmental
Conference. Although it is too early to tell how different the
final outcome will be from the Convention draft, it is time to
reflect on the Convention as process, and situate this EU
experiment in deliberative negotiating. In this EUSA Review
Forum, three authors look back at the work of the Convention
and analyze it in a historical and transatlantic light.
— Virginie Guiraudon, Forum Editor
Deliberating under the Shadow of the Veto
Paul Magnette
THE INK IS SCARCELY DRY on the “constitutional treaty” written by
the Convention on the Future of Europe. Yet, controversies about
the meaning of this experience have already begun. Some,
adopting a “realistic” point of view, see it as a classic form of
intergovernmental bargaining that does not alter the Union
structure significantly. Others, however, emphasise the novelty
of the method and the importance of the proposed legal changes.
These two lines of analysis are not necessarily contradictory. It
is difficult to deny that the Convention was merely a new bargain
between member states, governed by classic forms of mutual
concessions and log-rolling. Yet, the deliberative nature of the
process should not be neglected. To a certain extent, the
“deliberative constraint” that the process put on the actors partly
explains the outcome of the Convention.
Given the vagueness of the Laeken mandate, some initially
believed that the Convention would reach a consensual agreement
that would profoundly transform the Union and that the
governments would be forced to ratify. It was, however, naive to
think that the Convention could be “Europe’s Philadelphia.”
Nothing, in the present European situation could create a pressure
comparable to the military, commercial, political, moral and
religious crises that had led to the Philadelphia process. A realistic
assessment of the nature of the EU, of the international context
and of member state preferences raised doubts on the
Convention’s margin of manoeuvre.
The conventionnels did not initially restrict their horizons.
The classic dichotomy opposing “bargaining,” based on a narrow
defence of stable preferences, and “deliberation” defined as a
rational exchange of arguments aimed at reaching the “common
good,” seems to have structured the conventionnels’ image of
their own role. The Chairman of the Convention, former French
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, often echoed this ambition.
A priori, the Convention fulfilled some of the key conditions of a
fair deliberative process. It was a specially convened assembly,
representing a very large array of interests and ideologies. It
was formally independent from its creator and free to determine
its own procedures. This gave the conventionnels the opportunity
not to reproduce the logic of former intergovernmental
conferences (IGCs). Given the presence of members who were
not the representatives of the governments, they could have
examined a larger set of possible options, and could have formed
more fluid compromises.
The paradox of this Convention is that, although its members
adopted a deliberative style, their attitudes actually remained
crudely utilitarian. In most cases, the conventionnels played the
game of honest deliberation, presenting their interests as impartial
views seeking a compromise. In spite of this original and largely
autonomous process, they proved unable to overcome classic
divisions. In this mix of arguing and bargaining, the latter soon
dominated. The members never forgot that they were just a
preparatory body, and that their compromise would be
renegotiated by the governments in the next IGC. Deliberation
took place under the shadow of the veto.
This explains why the notion of “simplification” soon
became the label of the minimum compromise that members could
reach, and the conceptual tool used to forge it. In spite of all
their divisions, all groups in the Convention shared an awareness
of the Union’s complexity, a desire to make it simpler and the
belief that this would make it more acceptable. Federalists and
Euro-sceptic members disagreed on everything, except on that.
The emphasis put on the objective of simplification played
a double role. Negatively, it helped preclude the creation of new
institutions, on the ground that this would make the EU more
complicated. On the other hand, this argument justified the
reduction of the number and variety of norms and procedures.
This implied extending co-decision and qualified majority voting
(QMV) to many fields from which they had been deliberately
excluded in the past. The rationale for this change was not that
QMV would be more efficient, or that the European Parliament
might improve the quality of the decisions, but the quest for simp-
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lification. Here, arguing clearly counter-balanced bargaining.
This type of formal reasoning was not, however, an uncontro-
versial strategy. Many members, aware of the impact such a quest
for simplification might have on their interest, soon criticised
this form of argumentation. Some emphasised that complexity
was often needed in terms of efficiency; others added that
complexity is often the price to be paid for democracy. This
revealed the limit of the rhetoric of simplification. It offered a
minimum consensus on the diagnosis, and provided the members
with a “noble task” when the risk of failure was high. Still, its
practical impact remained limited. The fusion of the treaties, the
suppression of the pillars, the generalisation of co-decision and
QMV in legislative matters, the incorporation of the Charter of
Rights, are indeed important legal and symbolic changes,
especially given the intensity of the conflicts over these issues in
the past. It should not be forgotten, however, that these elements
of simplification have only been possible because the Praesidium
carefully listened to some members’ critics and accepted many
exceptions. More importantly, the rhetoric of simplification has
not significantly fostered other crucial reforms, i.e., the distri-
bution of competencies or the institutional framework.
The argument of those who, like Giscard and many others,
state that the Union will per se be more democratic, because its
“constitution” will be simpler and clearer, so that students and
people in the street will read it, is obviously overstated. Should
we then conclude that “simplification” is an argument found by
people who have spent hundreds of hours deliberating about the
EU’s future and who, because they realised they could not
overcome their divisions, presented “simplification” as a noble
task so as to preserve their self-esteem? Perhaps. Notwith-
standing, we should not neglect the importance of forms and
processes when we think about the EU’s legitimacy. First, form
matters in Western civic cultures. A simpler treaty, which looks
like a constitution and uses terms that are part of the citizen’s
usual political language, might be better accepted. Secondly, and
more importantly, we should not underestimate the importance
of confirming a constitutional agreement. The Convention has
not altered the Union’s structure significantly. But representatives
of its member states, of the EU institutions and of the candidate
countries, (some federalists, others euro-sceptics, some leftists,
others conservatives) have deliberated on all issues related to
the EU, examined all possible reforms, expressed in public the
largest spectrum of arguments ever made about the EU. This
confirmation changes the nature of the agreement, even if it does
not alter its content. Those who, in the past, criticised the EU
because it had been built behind closed doors, have lost their
argument. Those who criticised it on the ground that they had
had to, at the time of adhering, take the whole package without
having the opportunity to renegotiate the acquis, have also lost a
key argument. The reassertion and confirmation of the “consti-
tutional compact” by the Convention has not altered the compro-
mise, but it has strengthened its foundations. In the long term,
this might prove equally important.
Paul Magnette is professor of political science at the
European Studies Institute, Free University of Brussels.
The Draft Constitution: American Interest
Desmond Dinan
IF IMITATION IS THE HIGHEST form of flattery, then the EU is flattering
the U.S. outrageously. First, at the 2000 Lisbon Summit, the EU
set itself the ambitious goal of becoming, by 2010, “the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs.” The United States, with the most competitive economy
and a spectacular record of job creation in the 1990s, was the
obvious point of reference, although European leaders were too
savvy to say so. After all, praising the United States is not
particularly popular in Europe.
Moreover, in an implicit swipe at the Americans, the EU
stressed not only that it wanted to create “better” jobs, but also
that the Lisbon goal included “greater social cohesion.” By
emphasizing social cohesion, a concept unheard of in the United
States, the EU signaled its unwillingness to imitate the United
States wholeheartedly. Many observers would say that American-
style economic modernization and greater social cohesion are
incompatible objectives.
Constitutionally, however, the United States is the shining
city on the hill, at least according to the rhetoric of Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe.
Giscard rarely misses an opportunity to compare the Brussels
convention to the Philadelphia convention of 1787. It is trendy
for European pundits, who otherwise dismiss most things
American, to express an interest in U.S. constitutional history
and to claim to have read the Federalist Papers. By implication,
the EU wants to constitute itself like the United States of America.
Giscard even wanted to rename the EU the “United States of
Europe.”
Of course Giscard and others are quick to point out the unique
nature of European integration and that, regardless of what it
called itself, the EU could never be a full-fledged federation along
American lines. Comparisons with Philadelphia may be intended
to legitimize the Brussels convention, although few Europeans
followed the Convention closely and even fewer know much
about what happened in Philadelphia over two hundred years
ago. Perhaps the main reason for the comparison is to interest
Americans in the Convention, by appealing to their historical
knowledge and pride. Given that the number of Americans aware
of the Brussels convention is so small as to be insignificant, the
comparison with Philadelphia is clearly aimed at Americans who
follow European affairs, notably policy-makers and policy-
shapers in Washington, D.C.
Indeed, Giscard made a quasi-state visit to Washington in
February 2003 to trumpet the Convention. In a lecture at the
Library of Congress, he harped on the Philadelphia connection
(Giscard 2003). Giscard’s lecture was reminiscent of Walter
Hallstein’s at Columbia University in 1963, subsequently pub-
lished in the Political Science Quarterly (Hallstein, 1963).
Hallstein began with the requisite historical comparison, starting
with the Albany Congress of 1754. He famously described the
European Community as “a federation in the making,” and the
Rome Treaty as “a veritable constitution.” According to Hallstein,EUSA Review    Fall 2003    3
“History is on our side.” One can imagine French President
Charles de Gaulle’s apoplexy upon hearing about Hallstein’s
lecture, which mentioned the evils on the national veto and
anticipated its replacement by qualified majority voting for trade
policy in 1966. De Gaulle, who understood history differently,
threw Hallstein’s historical trajectory off course when he
precipitated the Empty Chair Crisis in July 1965, ostensibly over
budgetary proposals but really over the introduction of majority
voting in additional policy areas. Thereafter Hallstein’s days as
Commission president were numbered.
Giscard is not Hallstein. Nor is he de Gaulle. He is a
moderate (some might say lapsed) intergovernmentalist. The EU
today is not the EC of the early 1960s, which seemed to be soaring
ever upward, toward ever-closer union. The EU has a far broader
policy remit, has a large and growing membership of extremely
diverse countries, has endured many crises, and is much more
complex than the original EC. Having compared the Brussels
and Philadelphia conventions, Giscard elaborated in his Library
of Congress lecture upon the political and constitutional
differences between the United States and the EU, and explained
why the EU could never really be like the United States
Yet, like Hallstein before him, Giscard claimed that European
political integration was good for the United States. According
to Hallstein, European integration sought to replace “a system
which harnesses one giant with a number of comparative dwarfs
[with] a new system, which joins in partnership…twin units
which today are already comparable and which one day will be
equal.” Giscard put it more delicately, claiming that a stronger
EU would be “a much more valuable and trustworthy partner
for the United States,” allowing for “better organized and more
productive dialogue on global strategic issues.” Giscard made
another reference to Philadelphia, this time to President John F.
Kennedy’s famous Independence Day speech there. “We do not
regard a strong and united Europe as a rival,” Giscard quoted
Kennedy as saying, “but as a partner.”
A lot of water passed under the transatlantic bridge since
the 1960s. European integration excited Americans then; it bores
them now. George Ball, the influential Undersecretary of State
in the early 1960s, was an old friend of Jean Monnet’s and a
fanatical supporter of the European Community. There is nobody
remotely like Ball in Washington today. The curse of the Common
Agricultural Policy, the end of the Cold War, the fall-out from
the Balkan wars, and the Iraq debacle put paid to American
enthusiasm for the EU.
William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard and a more
influential Washington insider than Ball, does not think highly
of the EU. “As to whether a united Europe is better or worse for
America,” Kristol says, “It all depends on what the character of
that Europe is. It all depends on the concrete understanding of
how to deal with issues in the real world … In 1991 [during the
Gulf War], Europe was much less united and we had much more
support … Now, Europe is much more [united, but it isn’t] clear
to me that the greater integration of Europe has been helpful to
U.S. foreign policy in the last couple of years … a Europe whole,
at peace, and free is fine: a Europe divided, at peace, and free is
perfectly acceptable to me, and I don’t believe that the wholeness
or the unity is required to be at peace or free” (Kristol 2003). To
paraphrase Kennedy, the prevailing attitude in Washington is
that, “We regard a strong and united Europe (should it ever
happen) as at least a nuisance; at worst a disaster.”
The EU is out of fashion in the United States. This makes it
difficult to generate much interest in the Convention which,
because it took so long and produced such an outcome, is a
Godsend to EU-bashers. At a time when Washington faces urgent
international problems, and would welcome European support
(but only on its terms), the Convention looks like an exercise in
navel-gazing. As Kristol put it, “if you have the attitude of the
Bush Administration that we have extremely urgent threats out
there, and that five or ten years from now the world is either
going to be a world of rogue states with weapons of mass
destruction …destabilizing other regimes nearby, or we have a
chance to really, at this pivotal moment, make a fundamental
difference and begin to create a safer world …[then] you can’t
wait …[for] endless discussions [in a] constitutional convention
…about a common foreign [and] defense policy, greater defense
spending, and all that.”
Little wonder that Giscard’s visit to Washington, which
included a courtesy call on the Administration, attracted relatively
little attention. As the Convention came to a close, the New York
Times and the Washington Post ran lengthy, informative articles.
Other media outlets were less kind. Fox News, a cheering gallery
for the Administration, interviewed Charles Kupchan, of the
Council on Foreign Relations, about the Convention, and warned
its viewers that something sinister was afoot:
Interviewer (John Gibson):  “Charles Kupchan, we have to
keep an eye on these guys…so I hope you are coming back.”
Kupchan: “They’re coming up. We have got to keep looking
over the shoulder, John.” (Fox News 2003).
Coincidentally, just before the Convention ended, the Europe
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Committee on
International Relations held hearings on the future of transatlantic
relations. Surely that was an ideal opportunity for friends of the
EU to make a case for the draft constitutional treaty. Yet no one
dwelt on the Convention in their prepared statements (U.S. House
of Representatives 2003).
With the political tide in Washington turning against the
EU, it is just as well that the Convention received little attention.
The Administration may not have a policy of deliberately
undermining the EU, but it is happy to watch the EU stumble
and to play member states off against each other. If they think
about the EU at all, senior American officials want to know what
it does, not what it is or could become. Inclined to act rather than
philosophize, their interest in the EU is essentially utilitarian.
Even on that score the results of the Convention are hardly
reassuring. Two indirectly elected presidents, from the Com-
mission and the European Council, vying to represent the EU
internationally, is not an ideal outcome. Nor does combining in
the EU foreign minister the offices of High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and commissioner for
external relations mean that leading member states will streamline
foreign policy making in Brussels.
In truth, the Administration thinks that the EU is incapable4     Fall  2003   EUSA Review
of “getting its act together,” and that the consequences of doing
so, were it ever to happen, would not really benefit the United
States. Testifying before Congress in June, John Hulsman of the
Heritage Foundation explained that the “European Gaullists …
pushing for the creation of a more centralized, federal, coherent
European Union political construct do so by increasingly defining
themselves through their differences with Americans.” They are
“European Lilliputians [who], given their strategic weakness,
want to constrain the American Gulliver” (Hulsman 2003). Could
the Europeans really unite? The Administration and its friends
think not. As one of them recently put it: “Europe is in long-term
decline, economically, militarily, and demographically, while the
United States continues to grow” (Max Boot, 2003). So much,
as far as the United States is concerned, for the Lisbon strategy
and the draft constitutional treaty.
Desmond Dinan is Jean Monnet Chair and professor of
public policy at George Mason University.
“We the States”: Why the Anti-Federalists Have Won
Renaud Dehousse
REFERENCES TO THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION and to the making
of the U.S. Constitution were plentiful in and around the European
convention. To be sure, much of this is rhetorical. In reality, the
U.S. Constitution is seen by many Europeans as having given
birth to a political system that is too centralized to provide a
useful model for the EU—hence, inter alia, the widespread
opposition of the concept of “United States of Europe.” However,
American constitutional history provides useful yardsticks to
make sense of what the EU convention has achieved.
Why a constitution?
There are obvious analogies between the motives
underpinning the two conventional processes. Unavoidably, the
issues were different, as one would expect given the overall
context in which each of them took place. Yet in both cases, the
pressure for change was prompted by discontent with the existing
confederal structures.
In post-revolutionary America, the Articles of confederation
had been the focus of much criticism since the Continental
Congress could not respond to the necessities of the time. The
mushrooming of barriers to trade among the thirteen States, the
incapacity of state governments  to respond to social unrest and
threats to private property, the fear of excessive foreign (read :
European) influence were among the main concerns of the states
delegates in Philadelphia (Lacorne, 1989). On the European side,
since its establishment by the Maastricht Treaty, the Union has
been faced with recurrent criticism because of its alleged failure
to meet democratic standards. Moreover, as the prospect of
enlargement drew near, it appeared clearly that the institutional
architecture, initially conceived for a Community of six, and
which was already giving clear signs of weaknesses in a Union
of 15, would be severely crippled by the adhesion of another ten
countries. The problem was addressed in the Amsterdam and
Nice intergovernmental conferences, but, by general admission,
failed to receive a convincing answer. The deal struck in Nice
left a number of outstanding issues: the division of labour between
the EU and the member states, the status of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the role of national parliaments, etc. The
scars generated by the negotiation in several countries generated
a willingness to reopen the debate even before the Treaty was
ratified.
Also noteworthy is the way in which both conventional bodies
went beyond their initial brief. When recommending to the
Continental Congress to convene delegates from all thirteen states
in Philadelphia, the Annapolis Commission had only mentioned
the need to discuss trade and commerce issues, and Congress
had insisted that the Convention was summoned “for the sole
and express purpose of revising the Articles of confederation,”
which implied that the outcome of the proceedings was to be
ratified by all States. No mention was made of a constitution.
Similarly, in the European case, the Laeken declaration had
merely invited the Convention to address a long list of issues and
to “draw up a final document which may comprise either different
options … or recommendations if consensus is achieved.” The
adoption of a constitutional text was contemplated, but only as a
possibility in the long run, and the Convention was merely invited
to consider the pros and cons of this prospect.
As is known, both conventions ended up adopting a draft
constitution. Yet, the analogy stops there.
How much has been achieved?
Three features are worth recalling here about the document
adopted in Philadelphia. First, it was adopted in the name of the
American people, and came into force without having been
ratified by all states. One of the most populous, New York,
narrowly approved the new constitution only afterwards.
Secondly, the U.S. Constitution gave birth to a strong national
government, the authority of which was not directly dependent
on the will of the states (even though the system of check and
balances compelled it to take into consideration their views and
interests), and the powers of which have dramatically increased
in the twentieth century. Thirdly, the constitution contained several
key political innovations. One was the invention of federalism,
i.e., a tertium genus between unitary arrangements and the loose
confederal structures discussed in the Enlightenment literature
(Beer, 1993). At the heart of the system stood a bicameral
legislature, product of a “grand compromise” between those who
advocated the necessity to retain a principle of equal represent-
ation of states and supporters of a system in which seats would
be apportioned to the population of each state. Underlying this
arrangement was a new conception of representation and
legitimacy. James Madison’s often quoted remarks (in No.10 of
the Federalist Papers) on the necessity to “extend the sphere”
in order to prevent the capture of states’ governments by factions
are still viewed today as a manifesto for the pluralist model of
democracy.
All these elements stand in sharp contrast with the European
Constitution. While ostensibly coined in constitutional language,
this latter text is essentially a consolidated version of earlier
treaties. The reference to a constitution is a pure trompe l’œil
for, pursuant to the Laeken roadmap, it will now be reviewed by
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by all member countries, newcomers included. The states, and
not the people(s), will remain the masters of that treaty.
As regards its content, the draft constitution is dominated
by states’ fears to see their influence diluted in the European
system. Large states were concerned to avoid the emergence of
strong European institutions, while smaller countries were afraid
by the prospect of a domination by “big” member states.
These fears are apparent in the institutional structure
designed by the convention. Thus, it was felt necessary to reassert
that the political leadership of the EU rests with the European
Council. To consolidate that leadership, an office of President of
the European Council has been established, while the
responsibility for policy initiation, coordination and control of
the implementation still rests with the Commission. To
compensate for what was perceived as a victory of the big member
states, equality has been the motto as regards the composition of
the Commission: though the number of fully fledged
commissioners will be inferior to the number of member states
in the longer term, each country will be entitled to its own
Commissioner every two terms. This is likely to undermine the
Commission’s representativeness of by preventing large countries
from having “their ” commissioner in each executive, as common
sense would dictate.
A similar conservatism is apparent in the provisions on
foreign policy. The Constitution has institutionalized competition
between three poles for the leadership of EU external relations:
the new foreign minister, the President of the European Council
and the Commission, which will retain responsibility for a wide
range of “soft policy ” instruments: trade, development policy,
etc. The discussions at the convention on the status of the EU
diplomatic service outside of the Commission does not augur
well of the way this odd ménage à trois will function. Moreover,
the large member states have made it very clear that they were
not willing to relinquish their autonomy in the field of foreign
policy—hence, inter alia, their refusal to accept more QMV in
that area. The Foreign Minister will certainly have to struggle to
establish his/her authority.
States’ individual concerns thus appear to have prevailed
over the interest of all in devising an efficient system of
government. Moreover, innovations were actually rather scarce.
The novel features of the constitution are hardly new ideas: the
necessity of a stable President had been advocated by Giscard
d’Estaing a decade ago, the streamlining of legislative instruments
had been suggested by the Commission during the Maastricht
IGC, while the dismantling of the pillar structure was initiated
in Amsterdam. Ironically, the only unquestionable elements of
consolidation of the “central” institutions (the extension of QMV
and of co-decision) are strikingly similar to those of the last
intergovernmental conferences.
Debates in the convention had confirmed the existence of
two camps: on the one hand, the Federalists, who militated in
favor of stronger European executive, legitimated by universal
suffrage; on the other hand, the supporters of an intergovernmental
system, in which legitimacy is primarily derived from national
governments. Despite months of hard work, the convention was
unable to hammer out an innovative compromise between the
two. The so-called “European constitution” displays more
elements of continuity than elements of rupture with the past. To
the extent changes were introduced, they were primarily
motivated by the desire to prevent the emergence of a stronger
central government. In other words, to use U.S. constitutional
terminology, the Anti-federalists, supporters of states’ rights, have
had the upper hand.
Why have the anti-federalists prevailed?
Several reasons come to mind to explain this outcome. Anti-
federalist feelings have been gathering strength in the last decade.
Since the Delors Commission, national governments have come
to learn that their freedom of maneuver can at times be severely
limited by European constraints. Preserving their autonomy
against encroachments by European institutions has become a
regular concern in several countries. Many political innovations
of the past decade (from the High Representative for Foreign
Policy to the OMC) bear evidence of this concern, which was
also quite apparent in the Laeken agenda.
The absence of a clearly identified political project was also
felt. Europe has always been a project-based polity, in which
transfers of powers to supranational institutions were accepted
mainly because they were necessary to achieve common
objectives. The common management of coal and steel policies,
the common market, the 1992 program or the single currency
rallied broad support, which made it easier to agree on important
institutional innovations. In contrast, the agenda of the convention
was confined to institutional issues. Problems were approached
in an abstract fashion, which created an artificial divide between
larger and smaller countries, and ultimately weakened the pro-
integration camp.
But the way the reform process was designed also had strong
implications: national governments, many of which were far from
enthusiastic about the convention, had indicated that its results
would have to be assessed by an IGC. This forced convention
members to take into consideration the views put forward and
the warnings of governments’ delegates. Convention President
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing repeatedly came under fire for spending
more time negotiating with national governments than
deliberating with his fellow convention members. Last but not
least, governments played an active role on the floor of the
convention. Several of them decided to send in political heavy-
weights (generally their foreign minister), which transformed
the last months’ discussions into a kind of intergovernmental
negotiation. The main problem was no longer to identify the best
response to be given to common problems, but rather the
concessions needed to appease one government or the other.
Together, these elements explain why the individual concerns
of the states prevailed over common ambitions. As a result, the
eventual compromise does not differ substantially from that of
earlier institutional reforms. Hence this paradox: whereas the
U.S. constitution was largely drafted by supporters of a stronger
national government, for whom federalism was only an
acceptable compromise, the European Constitution rather reflects
the views of Anti-Federalists who hid their desire to preserve
the status quo behind a pro-European discourse.
Renaud Dehousse is Jean Monnet Chair and professor at
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